



Viproy VoIP Penetration and Exploitation Toolkit

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whois

- Security Consultant @ Sense of Security (Australia)
- 10+ Years Experience in Penetration Testing
- 800+ Penetration Tests, 40+ Focused on NGN/VoIP
 - SIP/NGN/VoIP Systems Penetration Testing
 - Mobile Application Penetration Testing
 - IPTV Penetration Testing
 - Regular Stuff (Network Inf., Web, SOAP, Exploitation...)
- Author of Viproy VoIP Penetration Testing Kit
- Author of Hacking Trust Relationships Between SIP Gateways
- DEFCON 21 VoIP Wars: Return of the SIP
- So, that's me



traceroute

- Viproy What?
- SIP Services and Security Problems
- Basic Attacks but in Easy Way
- Modules for Basic Attacks
- SIP Proxy Bounce Attack
- Fake Services and MITM
- (Distributed) Denial of Service
- Hacking Trust Relationships of SIP Gateways
- Fuzzing in Advance
- Out of Scope
 - RTP Services and Network Tests, Management
 - Additional Services
 - XML/JSON Based Soap Services




Viproy What?


- Viproy is a Vulcan-ish Word that means "Call"
- Viproy VoIP Penetration and Exploitation Kit
 - Testing Modules for Metasploit, MSF License
 - Old Techniques, New Approach
 - SIP Library for New Module Development
 - Custom Header Support, Authentication Support
 - New Stuffs for Testing: Trust Analyzer, Proxy etc
- Modules
 - Options, Register, Invite
 - Brute Forcers, Enumerator
 - SIP Trust Analyzer, Service Scanner
 - SIP Proxy, Fake Service, DDOS Tester



SIP Services : Internal IP Telephony



SIP Services : Commercial Services



Basic Attacks but in Easy Way

- We are looking for...
 - Finding and Identifying SIP Services and Purposes
 - Discovering Available Methods and Features
 - Discovering SIP Software and Vulnerabilities
 - Identifying Valid Target Numbers, Users, Realm
 - Unauthenticated Registration (Trunk, VAS, Gateway)
 - Brute Forcing Valid Accounts and Passwords
 - Invite Without Registration
 - Direct Invite from Special Trunk (IP Based)
 - Invite Spoofing (After or Before Registration, Via Trunk)

Basic Attacks but in Easy Way

- this isn't the call you're looking for
- We are attacking for...
 - Free Calling, Call Spoofing
 - Free VAS Services, Free International Calling
 - Breaking Call Barriers
 - Spoofing with...
 - Via Field, From Field
 - P-Asserted-Identity, P-Called-Party-ID, P-Preferred-Identity
 - ISDN Calling Party Number, Remote-Party-ID
 - Bypass with...
 - P-Charging-Vector (Spoofing, Manipulating)
 - Re-Invite, Update (Without/With P-Charging-Vector)



Basic Attacks but in Easy Way


- Modules for Discovery Register, Enumerator, Options, Invite
- Modules to Obtain Information Enumerator, Brute Forcer
- Modules to Attack VAS or Internal Services
 - Invite, Brute Forcer, Enumerator, Trust Analyzer
- Module to Initiate Calls, Billing Attacks and Privilege Analysis
 - Invite (Custom Header Support, Proxy Headers etc)
- Modules for Analyzing Trust Issues and Invite Spoofing
 - Invite, Trust Analyzer
- Module to Modify SIP Clients/Servers' Behaviors MITM Proxy
- Modules for DDOS/DOS All Modules

SIP Proxy Bounce Attack

- SIP Proxies Redirect Requests to Other SIP Servers
 - We Can Access Them via SIP Proxy then We Can Scan
 - We Can Scan Inaccessible Servers
 - URI Field is Useful for This Scan
- Viproy Pen-Testing Kit Has a UDP Port Scan Module

```
msf auxiliary(vsipportscan-options) > run
[+] 192.168.1.146:5060 is Open
   Server : FPBX-2.11.0beta2(11.2.1)
[+] 192.168.1.145:5070 is Open
   User-Agent : sipXecs/4.7.0 sipXecs/registry (Linux)
[+] 192.168.1.201:5061 is Open
   Server : sipXecs/xxxx.yyyy sipXecs/sipxbridge (Linux)
[+] 192.168.1.203:5060 is Open
   User-Agent : 3CXPhoneSystem 11.0.28976.849 (28862)
```


SIP Proxy Bounce Attack



- Attacking Inaccessible Servers
- Attacking SIP Software
 - Software Version, Type

Fake Services and MITM

Usage of Proxy & Fake Server Features



- Use ARP Spoof & VLAN Hopping & Manual Config
- Collect Credentials, Hashes, Information
- Change Client's Request to Add a Feature (Spoofing etc)
- Change the SDP Features to Redirect Calls
- Add a Proxy Header to Bypass Billing & CDR
- Manipulate Request at Runtime to find BOF Vulnerabilities

Fake Services and MITM

- We Need a Fake Service
 - Adding a Feature to Regular SIP Client
 - Collecting Credentials
 - Redirecting Calls
 - Manipulating CDR or Billing Features
 - Fuzzing Servers and Clients for Vulnerabilities
- Fake Service Should be Semi-Automated
 - Communiation Sequence Should be Defined
 - Sending Bogus Request/Result to Client/Server
- Viproy Pen-Testing Kit Has a SIP Proxy and Fake Service
- Fuzzing Support of Fake Service is in Development Stage

DOS – It's Not Service, It's Money



- Locking All Customer Phones and Services for Blackmail
- Denial of Service Vulnerabilities of SIP Services
 - Many Responses for Bogus Requests \rightarrow DDOS
 - Concurrent Registered User/Call Limits
 - Voice Message Box, CDR, VAS based DOS Attacks
 - Bye And Cancel Tests for Call Drop
 - Locking All Accounts if Account Locking is Active for Multiple Fails
- Multiple Invite (After or Before Registration, Via Trunk)
 - Calling All Numbers at Same Time
 - Overloading SIP Server's Call Limits
 - Calling Expensive Gateways, Targets or VAS From Customers
- Viproy Pen-Testing Kit Has a few DOS Features

DDOS – All Your SIP Gateways Belong to Us !

- SIP Amplification Attack
 - + SIP Servers Send Errors Many Times (10+)
 - + We Can Send IP Spoofed Packets
 - + SIP Servers Send Responses to Victim
 - => 1 packet for 10+ Packets, ICMP Errors (Bonus)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2	8.315312000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.145	SIP/SDP	938	Request: INVITE sip:701@viproy.com, with s
3	8.324730000	192.168.1.145	192.168.1.100	SIP	358	Status: 100 Trying
4	8.325086000	192.168.1.145	192.168.1.100	SIP	587	Status: 407 Proxy Authentication Required
5	8.430072000	192.168.1.145	192.168.1.100	SIP	587	Status: 407 Proxy Authentication Required
6	8.638928000	192.168.1.145	192.168.1.100	SIP	587	Status: 407 Proxy Authentication Required
7	9.040660000	192.168.1.145	192.168.1.100	SIP	587	Status: 407 Proxy Authentication Required


- Viproy Pen-Testing Kit Has a PoC DDOS Module
- Can we use SIP Server's Trust ? -wait for it-

Hacking SIP Trust Relationships

- NGN SIP Services Trust Each Other
 - Authentication and TCP are Slow, They Need Speed
 - IP and Port Based Trust are Most Effective Way
- What We Need
 - Target Number to Call (Cell Phone if Service is Public)
 - Tech Magazine, Web Site Information, News
- Baby Steps
 - Finding Trusted SIP Networks (Mostly B Class)
 - Sending IP Spoofed Requests from Each IP:Port
 - Each Call Should Contain IP:Port in From Section
 - If We Have a Call, We Have The Trusted SIP Gateway IP and Port
 - Brace Yourselves The Call is Coming

Hacking SIP Trust Relationships

Slow Motion



How Viproy Pen-Testing Kit Helps Fuzzing Tests

- Skeleton for Feature Fuzzing, NOT Only SIP Protocol
- Multiple SIP Service Initiation
 - Call Fuzzing in Many States, Response Fuzzing
- Integration With Other Metasploit Features
 - Fuzzers, Encoding Support, Auxiliaries, Immortality etc.
- Custom Header Support
 - Future Compliance, Vendor Specific Extensions, VAS
- Raw Data Send Support (Useful with External Static Tools)
- Authentication Support
 - Authentication Fuzzing, Custom Fuzzing with Authentication
- Less Code, Custom Fuzzing, State Checks
- Some Features (Fuzz Library, SDP) are Coming Soon

References

- Viproy VoIP Penetration and Exploitation Kit
 - Author : http://viproy.com/fozavci
 - Homepage : http://viproy.com/voipkit

Github : http://www.github.com/fozavci/viproy-voipkit

- Attacking SIP Servers Using Viproy VoIP Kit (50 mins) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbXh_L0-Y5A
- Hacking Trust Relationships Between SIP Gateways (PDF) http://viproy.com/files/siptrust.pdf
- VoIP Pen-Test Environment VulnVoIP http://www.rebootuser.com/?cat=371





Q ?







Thanks