

Hacking .NET Applications: The Black Arts



USA + 2011
EMBEDDING SECURITY


Jon McCoy

www.DigitalBodyGuard.com

THIS WILL COVER

- ◆ How-To Attack .NET Applications
- ◆ Tools and Methodology of Attacking
- ◆ Overcome “secure” .NET Applications
- ◆ Building KeyGen/Crack/Hacks/Malware
- ◆ Reverse Engenering for Protection

Attacking/Cracking IN MEM |||| ON DISK



ATTACK OVERVIEW



Attack on Disk

- Access Logic
- Infect Logic
- Hook Logic
- Decompile
- Recompile
- Debug



Attack in Memory/Runtime


- Inject Structure
- Navigate Structure
- Edit/Control Structure

Attack The Source

In Memory


OR

On Disk



Find the weak spot
Subvert the Logic/State
Control what you need

ATTACKING ON DISK



101 - DECOMPILERS

DEMO

GrayWolf – IL_Spy – Reflector



101 - ATTACK ON DISK

● Connect/Open - Access Code

● Decompile - Get code/tech

● Infect - Change the target's code

● Exploit - Take advantage

● Remold Application - WIN

101 - Recon

EHSHELL .NET Framework
Ver 3.5



Windows
Media Center

Un-0bfu\$ca7ed

Crash Reporting
Watson

Coded in C#

101 - Recon



● File Location

C:\Windows\ehome\ehshell.dll

● StrongName KEY

d:\w7rtm.public.x86fre\internal\strongnamekeys\fake\windows.snk

● Registry CurrentUser OR LocalMachine

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Media Center\

● Web Host Address

www.microsoft.com/WindowsMedia/Services/2003/10/10/movie

CRACK THE APP



Flip The Check



Cut The Logic



Return True



Access Value




Set Value is “True”



SET VALUE TO "TRUE"

~~bool Registered = false;~~

~~If(a != b)~~





CUT THE LOGIC

```
bool IsRegistered()
```

```
{
```

```
    Return “TRUE”
```

```
}
```



ACCESS VALUE

```
bool ValidPassword(int x)
{
    ShowKey(Pass);
    Return (x==Pass);
}
```

CRACK



CRACK the weak Media Center

CRACK



PASSWORD

```
public static bool CheckPin(string pin)
{
    ParentalControl.Settings.PIN = null;
    ParentalControl.Settings.Load();
    string text = ParentalControl.Settings.PIN;
    if (text == null)
    {
        return 1;
    }
    if (text.Length > 0)
    {
        if (text.get_Chars(0) == 58)
        {
            goto Block_6;
        }
    }
    ParentalControlPin.StoreNewPin(text);
    return text == pin;
    Block_6:
    return text == ParentalControlPin.HashForPin(pin);
}
```

CRACK








DEMO

CRACK THE KEY

Attack the STRONG

“I’m sure they protected
the registration check”

CRACK THE KEY

	Complex Math	==	Complex Math
	Public/Private	==	Change Key
	Challenge	==	Make it EZ
	3/B==Name*C	==	ASK what is /B?
	Call Server	==	Hack the Call



COMPLEX MATH

1. Chop up the Math
2. Attack the Weak
3. ????????????
4. Profit



CHANGE THE KEY

If you can beat them
Why join them

Key = “123456ABCDE”



CHALLENGE

Complex Math


OR

Control the Challenge

REG CODE


Name: ➡ 5G9P3 ➡
JON DOE

Code: ➡
98qf3uy







REG CODE

Name: ➡  ➡





Code: ➡  



REG CODE

Name:   
JON DOE

Code:  
5G9P3

WIN



FAKE SERVER CALL

1. Seed the Request
2. Fake the Reply
3. Kill the Call

DEMO

CRACK A KEY



IL – Intermediate Language

Code of the Matrix |||| NEW ASM

1	ldarg.0		78	stloc.2		171	ldobj	System.Int32	235	stloc.3	
2	newobj	System.Void System.Random..ctor(System.Int32)	79	ldloc.2		176	ldloc.0		236	ldloc.3	
3	stloc.0		80	ldc.i4.0		177	ldc.i4	10000	237	brtrue	IL_01c8 rd
4	ldc.i4.4		81	ldstema	System.Int32	182	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	242	ldarg.0	
5	newarr	System.Int32	86	dup		187	add		246	ldloc.1	
6	stloc.1		87	ldobj	System.Int32	188	stobj	System.Int32	248	ldc.i4.2	
7	ldloc.1		92	ldloc.0		198	ldarg.0		249	ldstema	
8	ldc.i4.0		98	ldc.i4.c	10	199	ldloc.1		249	rem	
9	ldloc.0		99	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	199	ldc.i4.0		257	ldloc.2	
10	ldc.i4.c	10	100	add		199	ldstema		249	ldc.i4.1	
11	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	101	stobj	System.Int32	197	rem		249	ldstema	
12	ststema		106	ldloc.2		198	ldloc.2		250	add	
13	ldloc.1		107	ldc.i4.1		199	ldc.i4.3		251	ldc.i4	917
14	ldc.i4.1		108	ldstema	System.Int32	200	ldstema		256	eq	
15	ldloc.0		110	dup		201	add		259	ldc.i4.0	
16	ldc.i4.c	100	114	ldobj	System.Int32	202	ldc.i4	5555	259	eq	
17	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	119	ldloc.0		207	eq		261	stloc.3	
18	ststema		120	ldc.i4.c	100	208	ldc.i4.1		262	ldloc.3	
19	ldloc.1		122	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	210	eq		266	brtrue	IL_01c8 rd
20	ldc.i4.2		127	add		212	stloc.3		268	ldarg.0	
21	ldloc.0		128	stobj	System.Int32	213	ldloc.3		269	ldloc.1	
22	ldc.i4	1000	133	ldloc.2		214	brtrue	IL_01c8 rd	270	ldc.i4.3	
23	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	134	ldc.i4.2		218	ldarg.0		271	ldstema	
24	ststema		135	ldstema	System.Int32	220	ldloc.1		272	rem	
25	ldloc.1		140	dup		221	ldc.i4.1		276	ldloc.2	
26	ldc.i4.3		141	ldobj	System.Int32	222	ldstema		274	ldc.i4.0	
27	ldloc.0		146	ldloc.0		223	rem		276	ldstema	
28	ldc.i4	10000	147	ldc.i4	1000	224	ldloc.2		276	add	
29	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	152	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	225	ldc.i4.2		277	ldc.i4	940
30	ststema		157	add		226	ldstema		282	eq	
31	ldarg.0		168	stobj	System.Int32	227	add		284	ldc.i4.0	
32	newobj	System.Void System.Random..ctor(System.Int32)	169	ldloc.2		228	ldc.i4.c	99	285	eq	
33	stloc.0		164	ldc.i4.3		230	eq		287	stloc.3	
34	ldc.i4.4		165	ldstema	System.Int32	232	ldc.i4.1		288	ldloc.3	

IT CAN'T BE THAT EZ

NO

PROTECTION ON DISK

Protection - Security by 0b\$cur17y

- Code Obfuscation
- Logic Obfuscation
- Shells / Packers / Encrypted(code)
- Unmanaged calls.....

SHUTDOWN Decompilation

PROTECTION ON DISK

Obfuscated

```
public static bool XXXX()
{
    try
    {
        bool flag = ( & 4) == 4;
    }
    catch (Exception exception)
    {
        XXXX.XXX(arg_0F_0, box(Application));
        throw;
    }
    return flag;
}
```

PROTECTION ON DISK

- Protection – Security by security
 - Signed code (1028 bit CRYPTO)
 - Verify the creator
 - ACLs..... M\$ stuff

This can SHUTDOWN
Tampering

UNPROTECTED/PROTECTED



IT CAN'T BE THAT EZ



NO

YES

NEW ATTACK VECTOR

SIGNED CODE HACKING





Signed code is based on

- Private Key - 1028 bit
- Signed Hash of Code
-

SIGNED CODE CHECKING IS OFF BY DEFAULT

FAKE SIGNED DLL



FAKE SIGN DLL/EXE

Y U NO Check



Y ASK 4 PASSWORD

NEW ATTACK VECTOR


ASM THE OLD IS NEW




- Shell Code - ASM
- UNmanaged
- NO .NET Security
-

Attack from ASM(unmannaged)
The Gate is Down


FAKE SIGNED DLL



Attacking / Cracking In MEM |||| On Disk



ATTACKING .NET APPLICATIONS: AT RUNTIME



ATTACKING APPS

- 🎯 Gain Full Access

 - 🎯 Reverse Engineer

 - 🎯 Attack (on Disk or in MEM)

 - 🎯 Take out the “Security”

 - 🎯 Control the Program

DEMO: GOD MODE

Inject and Control



PAST TALKS

Hacking .NET Application: A Runtime Attack

Control the Runtime
Control the Application

IF YOU'RE NOT A HACKER WHY SHOULD YOU CARE?

Defend your Applications

Defend your Systems

Verify your Tools\Programs

VERIFY YOUR APPLICATIONS

What is the Crypto & KEY
What info is it sending home
Does it have Backdoors?
Is your data Secure?

REVERSE ENGINEERING

What is going on?

What technology is used?

Any MaLWare?

AM I safe?

REVERSE ENGINEERING

Hack your applications

Don't be helpless



DON'T

LOOK





SECURITY



The Login security check is

- Does $A == B$
- Does $MD5\%5 == X$
- Is the Pass the Crypto Key



DATA LEAK



The Data sent home is

- Application Info
- User / Serial Number
- Security / System Data



KEY



The Crypto Key is

- A Hard Coded Key

- The Licence Number

- A MD5 Hash of the Pass

- 6Salt 6MD5 Hash of the Pass



CRYPTO




The Crypto is

- DES 64
- Tripple DES 192
- Rijndael AES 256
- Home MIX (secure/unsecure)

BAD SOFTWARE

Y U NO CRYPT



Y ASK 4 PASSWORD

THE OLD IS NEW AGAIN

ASM-SHELLS



Pointers in .NET

- What are they good for?
- Are they safe?
- What about the Runtime?
- So ASM-Shells....

MALWARE T1M3
MALWARE T1M3


Protection (Shell Crypto)

Attack (Unmanaged Calls)

Protection (Obfuscated Code)

Fake (Signed DLL Protection)

MALWARE T1M3



MALWARE HIDE WATNMA BE HIDE REUSE TARGET



- Intelligent names
- Code style
- Don't use loops
- Don't use one area for your Vars
- Access the normal program
- Link to Events
- Use Timers
- Call back into your target
- Spread out your Vars and code

MALWARE FIGHT WATNMAE EICHL



● TD3Ms

● fDP3St

Protect Me! 2010 ● VfSdaI
● Rijndael

● Salt

● Good VI

0b\$cur17y
Androsa FileProtector

Androsa FileProtector

Version 1.4.4

Copyright © AndrosaSoft 2009

MALWARE FIGHT MAYMAYBE



Androsa File Protector

Version 1.4.4

Copyright © AndrosaSoft 2009

 **black hat**® USA + 2011

MALWARE FIGHT

Protect Me! 2010



```
{
this.filesToAdd = new List<string>();
base..ctor();
this.InitializeComponent();
this.Text = this.AssemblyTitle + "" + this.Assem
if ((int)par.Length == 1)
{
    if (par[0].Contains("en"))
    {
        this.langParEn = 1;
    }
}
```

Androsa FileProtector

```
private void x03a69b6bf16c508c()
{
    var arg_AA_0 = this.xef9c50c23fdde0e7;
    object[] array = new object[6];
    array[0] = this.x991baafb3e2f1814.getTranslation
('meifjaagfahgfaog', 127490266));
    array[1] = string.Intern(x1110bdd110cdcea4._d57
    array[2] = box(System.Int32, this.xe25232a1a3e3
    array[3] = string.Intern(x1110bdd110cdcea4._d57
    array[4] = box(System.Int32, this.xe25232a1a3e3
    array[5] = string.Intern(x1
    arg_AA_0.Text = string.C
```

Androsa FileProtector

Version 1.4.4

Copyright © AndrosaSoft 2009

MALWARE FIGHT MAYMAYBE



Androsa File Protector

Version 1.4.4

Copyright © AndrosaSoft 2009

 **black hat**® USA + 2011

PROTECTION FOR WHO?



0bfu\$ca73

WHAT M\$ DID **RIGHT**

Un-obfuscated Code

- Σ Good for user security
- Σ User can see what they are running

.NET Framework Security

- Σ Targeted Security Access
- Σ Protect the Computer from the app

Giving Reduced Rights Inside Code

- Σ Put venerable code in a box
- Σ Mitigate Risk, Segment Risk

WHAT M\$ DID **WRONG**

MixModeCode – Bad for security

- Σ This allows unmanaged code
- Σ This breaks out of .NET security

GAC & Native Image Override

- Σ Removes ability to secure code

Not Hash Checking Code

- Σ Good for hackers

ATTACKING APPS

- 🎯 Read my papers: Reflections Hidden Power & Attacking .NET at Runtime
- 🎯 Watch 2010 Presentations on Attacking .NET DefCon 18, AppSec-DC, DojoCon
- 🎯 Look up Presentations and Research from Andrew Willson, Erez Ezule, Arndet Mandent
- 🎯 Use tools: Visual Studio/MonoDev Reflector/GrayWolf/ILspy/.../ILASM/ILDASM

FIN



MORE INFORMATION @:
www.DigitalBodyGuard.com

FIN = 1



HACKER VS ATTACKER

