

Stealth Attacks: Detection and Investigation

Ryan Jones + Thomas Mackenzie



Ryan Jones

- Managing Consultant Incident Response at Trustwave SpiderLabs.
- Law Enforcement and Private Sector Experience
- Computer, mobile telephone and network investigations
- Lead Investigator for 'Level 1' Service Providers and Merchants



Thomas Mackenzie

- Application Security Consultant at Trustwave SpiderLabs
- Multiple Publications
- Co Leader of OWASP Birmingham UK
- Founder of upSploit Advisory Management





Agenda

Part 1 – Developing a stealth attack

Part 2 – Stopping the attacks at the framework



Part 1

Developing a stealth attack

Agenda

- 1. Blackhat vs. Investigator
- 2. Stealth Attack Principles
- 3. Stealth Attack Live Demo
- 4. Stealth Attack Lessons
- 5. Stealth Attack Architecture Improvement



What do Blackhats do?

- Steal information
- Maintain access
- Defacements
- Common vulnerabilities
- 0 days

- What do Investigators do?
 - Gather data
 - Review logs
 - Recover data
 - Evaluate information
 - Draw conclusions

Tom = Blackhat

- Find vulnerability
- Exploit vulnerability
- Upload web shell
- Collect passwords

Ryan = Investigator

- Collect information
- Web log analysis
- Conclude what happened

Debrief – Attack 1

- IP address of attacker
- Date and time of initial exploitation
- Upload of malware
- Malware actions
- Date and time of password collection code

Introduction – Attack 2

- Not happy!
- What can be done to stop this logging?
- More stealthy attacks...

Blackhat - What am I going to do differently?

- Disassociate vulnerability finding IP from exploit IP
- Use web shell not found by AV
- Minimise usage of web shell
- Remove the web shell after usage

Ryan = Investigator

- Collect information
- Web log analysis
- Conclude what happened

Debrief – Attack 2

- IP address of attacker
- Date and time of initial exploitation
- Upload of malware
- Malware actions
- Date and time of password collection code

Stealth Attack Principles

Elite hackers grant me the serenity to accept the things that must be logged; courage to change the things that don't; and wisdom to know the difference.

Original by: Reinhold Niebuhr – Modified by: Ryan Jones



Stealth Attack Principles

- 1. Identify a vulnerability independently
- 2. Discover as much as possible legitimately
- 3. Analyse likely logging
- 4. Obfuscate accordingly
- 5. Remove trace



Stealth Attack

Introduction – Stealth Attack

- Take into account the five principles
- Find the vulnerability
- Exploit the vulnerability
- Upload web shell
- Collect password
- Remove web shell
- Sit back and relax...



RELAXING.....







Stealth Attack Principles

- 1. Identify a vulnerability independently
- 2. Discover as much as possible legitimately
- 3. Analyse likely logging
- 4. Obfuscate accordingly
- 5. Remove trace



Stealth Attack Principles

Investigation

- What evidence is available?
- What evidence are we likely to find?

Stealth Attack Principles

Conclusion

- Designing attacks around logs is highly achievable
- Attackers gain assurance of less detection rates
- Investigators lose assurance of detection rates



Part 2

Stopping the attacks at the framework

Agenda

1. Current application protection methods

Framework Level Security Profiling and Monitoring (FLSPM)

3. Demonstration of FLSPM



Application Protection Methods

PHPIDS

- Blacklisting with heuristic checks to find known attack signatures and variations
- No profiling available, all or nothing
- What risk level is okay?

Application Protection Methods

WAF

- Checks are made on requests using pattern matching and rule sets.
- Checks are made on responses too, making sure nothing got past the input sanitisation.
- Site wide profiling (normally)
- No analysis on the application source code, rendering them "dumb" to what the application does.


Application Protection Methods


Hardened PHP -

- Protects against vulnerabilities in the engine, runtime and session.
- Filtering certain characters and requests.
- Site wide profiling, no ability to profile for one particular page or separate applications.

Principles

- Most systems rely on a single source of data.
- Administrators have access to much more data.
- Increase the detail of data → Reduces decision making complexity.







• Code

- Logging
- Blocking
- Function Catch

Written in PHP



Limitations

PHP implementation: Trivial bypass

Profiling decisions are binary.

Limited data for decision making.



Questions?

ryan.jones@trustwave.com tmackenzie@trustwave.com