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# Industrial Bug Mining

Extracting, Grading and Enriching  
the Ore of Exploits

# The Bug Mining Analogy

- Phase 1: Extraction
- Phase 2: Grading
- Phase 3: Enrichment
- Phase 4: ???
- Phase 5: Profit!

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## Welcome to the Mt era

- 2009: We use 8 servers to build a virtualised fuzzfarm
  - Sustained testing speed: 30 t/s (2.5Mt / day)
- April 2010: MS describe their ‘fuzzing botnet’
  - “12 million iterations in a weekend” (6Mt/day)
  - Now upwards of 10Mt/d
- May 2010: Project MAN VERSUS BORG!!11! (Bugmine 2.0)
  - Same hardware, complete stripdown and rebuild
  - Test and optimise code / architecture at every step
  - Sustained testing speed:  $\geq 1.12\text{Mt/h}$




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## Scale

1. Make each node faster by eliminating bottlenecks
  - network, disk, IO, serialisation, extraneous target code, node OS overhead....
  - You're not doing it right until the last bottleneck is CPU time spent on the real target code
2. When adding new nodes, scale as close to perfectly as possible


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## Building It

- Switch from ESXi to KVM
  - Real linux, we know how use it
  - Performance is apparently ‘comparable’
- Move storage to a dedicated network
  - Open iSCSI, 4 x 160GB SSD in RAID 0, 4xGigE NIC
  - Oracle Cluster Filesystem (OCFS2) on top
- Optimise Harness
  - Ruby is slow anyway, but I removed the worst problems
- Optimise Fuzzbots
  - Kill explorer.exe for ~15% speedup?!
  - Don’t open a brand new Office process every time






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## Building It

- Easier Provisioning
  - One fuzzbot template
  - Multiple “overlays” (aka “linked clones”)
  - “Snapshot Mode” on top of that
  - Template changes and new rollouts happen in minutes.
- Easier and more powerful management
  - ... assuming you like bash and ssh
- Total Software Cost \$0 (using MSDN licenses)
- Total Hardware Cost ~ 30k USD


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
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
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## Features

- Software “Hot swap”
- Tagged queues
- Any DB backend
- Any case producer frontend
- Everything scales horizontally – n producers, n distribution nodes etc etc

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## Bug Triage

- There is “exploitable” and EXPLOITABLE.
- !exploitable rocks, but not for this.
- Here are some examples from Word 2007

(X's will be removed for the show, just for fun)





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```
head -15 summary.txt
=====SUMMARY=====
<none?>: 229
total: 59965
PROBABLY NOT EXPLOITABLE: 21409
UNKNOWN: 31013
PROBABLY EXPLOITABLE: 6032
EXPLOITABLE: 1282
621 Buckets. 373 unique EIPs.
<none?>: 1
EXPLOITABLE: 88
UNKNOWN: 336
PROBABLY NOT EXPLOITABLE: 86
PROBABLY EXPLOITABLE: 110
=====
```



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## Bug Examples

--- 0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF (count: 4) ---

EXPLOITABLE: Exploitable - User Mode Write AV starting at  
mso!Ordinal7111+0xxx (Hash=0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF)

```
XXXXXXXX 885e21    mov    byte ptr [esi+21h],bl
```

```
ds:0023:32688488=c3
```

```
eax=c9330048 ebx=00000000 ecx=32688467 edx=00000000 esi=32688467  
edi=00000000 eip=XXXXXXXX esp=001252e8 ebp=001252fc
```

Potentially overwrite a byte with null. Then what?



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## Bug Examples

```
--- 0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF (count: 29) ---
```

```
PROBABLY EXPLOITABLE: Probably Exploitable - Read Access Violation  
on Control Flow starting at wplib!wdGetApplicationObject+0xFFFFX  
(Hash=0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF)
```

```
XXXXXXXX ff5028    call    dword ptr [eax+28h]
```

```
ds:0023:00000029=????????
```

```
eax=00000001 ebx=00000000 ecx=022b6590 edx=00121b1c esi=001218b0
```

```
edi=06440000 eip=XXXXXXXX esp=001210d0 ebp=00122140
```

Only awesome if eax is controlled as a 32 bit value...



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## Bug Examples

```
--- 0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF (count: 1) ---
```

```
EXPLOITABLE: Exploitable - Read Access Violation on Control Flow  
starting at wplib!FMain+0xFFFF (Hash=0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF)
```

```
XXXXXXXX ff5004    call    dword ptr [eax+4]
```

```
ds:0023:b4b4b4b8=????????
```

```
eax=b4b4b4b4 ebx=00000000 ecx=01f8cf6c edx=0012e6a8 esi=01f8cf6c  
edi=06e2366c eip=XXXXXXXX esp=0012e674 ebp=0012e680
```

... like this



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## Bug Examples

```
--- 0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF (count: 3) ---
```

```
PROBABLY NOT EXPLOITABLE: Read Access Violation near NULL starting  
at wplib!DllGetLCID+0xXXX (Hash=XXXXXXXX.0xFFFFFFFF)
```

```
XXXXXXXX d7          xlat      byte ptr [ebx]          ds:0023:00000000=??
```

```
eax=00120000 ebx=00000000 ecx=01efff68 edx=0012ca20 esi=01ef9568
```

```
edi=07971bec eip=XXXXXXXX esp=01efa093 ebp=fff501f8
```

```
3213a302 xlat byte ptr [ebx]
```

```
3213a303 std
```

```
3213a304 fdivr st,st(5)
```

```
3213a306 fscale
```

# !exploitable fail



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## Bug Examples

```
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=07a4e008 edx=07a4e440  
esi=07a4e43c edi=00000003 eip=07a4e000 esp=0012f650  
ebp=0000000d iopl=0          nv up ei pl zr na pe nc  
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000  
efl=00010246
```

```
07a4e000 0000          add     byte ptr [eax],al  
ds:0023:00000000=??
```

```
EVENT:DEBUG_EVENT_EXCEPTION
```

```
e06d7363 Exception in winext\msec.dll.exploitable debugger  
extension.
```

```
PC: 7c812afb VA: 0006d098 R/W: 19930520 Parameter:  
10026bfc
```

## EPIC !exploitable fail



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## Bug Examples

```
--- 0xFFFFFFFF.0xFFFFFFFF (count: 1) ---
```

```
EXPLOITABLE: Exploitable - Read Access Violation at the  
Instruction Pointer starting at Unknown Symbol @ 0x0
```

```
01010101 ?? ???
```

```
eax=06510000 ebx=0012dc14 ecx=064f56a8 edx=00000000 esi=001297cc  
edi=00000000 eip=01010101 esp=00125320 ebp=00129724
```

!exploitable needs a new 'KACHING' classification

But crashes that cool must be rare, right?



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# Not so much...

```
125 eip=00000000
22 eip=00000001
7 eip=00000002
5 eip=00000003
1 eip=00000007
2 eip=00000008
1 eip=0000000c
4 eip=0000000e
4 eip=00000014
1 eip=00000015
2 eip=00000067
1 eip=0000006f
1 eip=00000070
1 eip=00000086
2 eip=00000101
1 eip=00000181
1 eip=00000225
2 eip=00000300
2 eip=00000b33
1 eip=00001571
1 eip=00001733
1 eip=0000671d
2 eip=00006887
1 eip=00008201
9 eip=0000c084
1 eip=0000da66
1 eip=0000db01
3 eip=00320031
1 eip=00380032
```

```
29 eip=004001b8
20 eip=004002b8
1 eip=0044002e
1 eip=00510005
1 eip=0061004c
2 eip=00640072
4 eip=00650069
5 eip=00650074
1 eip=00690046
1 eip=00690053
1 eip=006c0070
1 eip=006e0065
1 eip=006f002e
2 eip=006f0068
1 eip=0070006f
1 eip=00720063
2 eip=00740069
1 eip=006e0065
1 eip=006f002e
2 eip=006f0068
1 eip=0070006f
1 eip=00720063
2 eip=00740069
4 eip=01010101
1 eip=01040101
1 eip=04000000
4 eip=04010101
1 eip=04030100
4 eip=04850f49
```

```
2 eip=04c25d5e
1 eip=0a09007c
2 eip=0f800000
1 eip=14065a00
1 eip=16010273
1 eip=249f009a
1 eip=277f00fa
228 eip=2a680531
1 eip=40180000
1 eip=42c2fea9
1 eip=43003d00
3 eip=458b50ff
2 eip=507e8068
2 eip=56ec8b55
4 eip=575c302e
1 eip=60010006
2 eip=65747369
2 eip=676e6964
1 eip=6f6c6f43
6 eip=776f6853
1 eip=80000001
1 eip=8bec8b55
1 eip=90909090
1 eip=b0202fd0
4 eip=b4b4b4b4
357 eip=c13b0000
1 eip=c240c033
5 eip=c3321204
5 eip=c3efa5c3
```

```
1 eip=f7c88b08
1 eip=f98b5733
1 eip=ff010274
2 eip=ff8f4aa3
1 eip=ff8f4b29
2 eip=ffffffff
```



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# Curse you, Aitel!

`"Take each basic block and number it. Execute the program twice, once with your crashing file, and once with your template. This generates two signals, which have a stream of numbers in them (from the execution trace). Then you can do interesting things[...]"`

`-- Dailydave ML, 6/8/09`



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## Curse you, Aitel!

`"I'm not sure what the interesting thing here is that magically tells you something is worth really digging into? Maybe you take your two signals, and subtract their frequencies and visualize how different they are? Throw that at a HMM/NN and make it tell you something?"`

`-- Dailydave ML, 6/8/09`

## Step 0 - Runtrace


- We used DynamoRIO
- VERY fast, kind of a pain in the butt to work with
- Our call tracer is pretty much a “hello world” plugin
- Getting it to make took way longer than writing the code
- (All the runtrace side was written by The Grugq)

# Problems

- The 'streams of numbers' are really long
- Visualisation turned out not to be useful
- FFT and HMM etc were red herrings
- NN is buzzword bingo
- We could just use diff, if we could work out a way to make the sequences small enough....




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# Heirarchical Grammars

pease porridge hot  
pease porridge cold  
pease porridge in the pot  
nine days old  
some like it hot  
some like it cold  
some like it in the pot  
nine days old

The SEQUITUR Algorithm

<http://sequitur.info/>

Written by

Craig Nevill-Manning, Rutgers University,

Ian Witten, University of Waikato, New Zealand





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0 -> 1 2 3 4 3 5 6 2 6 4 6 5 \n

1 -> p e a s 7 r r i d g 8

2 -> h o t

3 -> \n 1

4 -> c 9

5 -> 10 \_ t h 7 t \n n 10 8 d a y s \_ 9

6 -> \n s o m 8 l i k 8 i t \_

7 -> 8 p o

8 -> e \_

9 -> o l d

10 -> i n

The SEQUITUR Algorithm

<http://sequitur.info/>

Written by

Craig Nevill-Manning, Rutgers University,

Ian Witten, University of Waikato, New Zealand

# Problems

- The grammar is generated on the fly, so different files will generate different grammars
- Wrote a ‘recompressor’
  - Convert the grammar to a ‘Trie’
  - Use the Trie to apply a selected grammar to a selected sequence

## The approach

- Take transitions  $addrA \rightarrow addrB$
- Store in a DB, use the tuple index as sequence elements
- Recompress the original and variant TIS
- Diff
- Post process the diff to add some interesting info



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Annoying, hard to read  
green screen demo...



# Beer!

But questions may be asked first.

ben at coseinc dot com